|Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression Volume 1|
|Prev||Chapter 9. CHAPTER IX - LAUNCHING OF WARS OF AGGRESSION||Next|
The independence of Belgium, which for so many centuries was the cockpit of Europe, was guaranteed by the great European powers in 1839. that guarantee was observed for 75 years, until it was broken by the Germans in 1914, who brought all the horrors of war, and the even greater horrors of German occupation, to Belgium. History was to repeat itself in a still more catastrophic fashion some 25 years after, in 1940.
Among the applicable treaties are the Hague Convention of 1907 (TC-3; TC-4), the Locarno arbitration and Conciliation Convention of 1925, in which Belgium's independence and neutrality were guaranteed by Germany; the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, by which all the Powers renounced recourse to war; and the Hague Convention of Arbitration and Conciliation May 1926 between Germany and the Netherlands (TC-16). Article I of the letter treaty provides:
"The contracting parties" (the Netherlands and the German Reich) "undertake to submit all disputes of any nature whatever which may arise between them which it has not been possible to settle by diplomacy, and which have not been referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice, to be dealt with by arbitration or conciliation as provided," (TC-16)
Subsequent clauses deal with the machinery of conciliation. The last article, Article 21, provides that the convention shall be valid for ten years, and then shall remain in force for successive periods of five years until denounced by either party. And this treaty never was denounced by Germany at all.
The last of the applicable treaties, all of which belong to the days of the Weimar Republic, is the Treaty of arbitration and Conciliation between Germany and Luxembourg, executed at Geneva in 1829 (TC-20). The first few words of Article 1 are familiar:
"The contracting parties undertake to settle by peaceful means all disputes of any nature whatever which may arise between them and which it may not be possible to settle by diplomacy." (TC-20)
Then follow clauses dealing with the machinery for peaceful settlement of disputes, which are in the common form.
Those were the treaty obligations between Germany and Belgium at the time when the Nazi Party came into power in 1933. Hitler adopted and ratified the obligations of Germany under the Weimer Republic with regard to the treaties which had been entered into. Nothing more occurred to alter the position of Belgium until March 1936. Germany reoccupied the Rhineland and announced the resumption of conscription. And Hitler, on 7 March 1936 purported in a speech to repudiate the obligations of the German Government under the Locarno Pact, the reason being given as the execution of the Franco-Soviet Pact of 1935. There was no legal foundation for this claim that Germany was entitled to renounce obligations under the Locarno Pact. But Belgium was left in the air, in the sense that it had itself entered into various obligations under the Locarno Pact in return for the liabilities which other nations acknowledge, and now one of those liabilities, namely, the liability of Germany to observe the Pact, had been renounced.
And so on 30 January 1937, perhaps because Hitler realized the position of Belgium and of the Netherlands, Hitler gave solemn assurance-he used the word "solemn"-which amounted to a full guarantee (TC-33). In April 1937, France and England released Belgium from her obligations under the Locarno Pact. Belgium gave guarantees of strict independence and neutrality, and France and England gave guarantees of assistance should Belgium be attacked. It was because of those facts that Germany, on 13 October 1937, gave a clear and unconditional guarantee to Belgium:
"I have the honor on behalf of the German Government to make the following communication to your Excellency: the German Government has taken cognizance with particular interest of the public declaration in which the Belgium Government defines the International position of Belgium. For its part, it has repeatedly given expressions, especially through the declaration made by the British and French Governments on the 24th of April 1937 * * *
"Since the conclusion of a treaty to replace the Treaty of Locarno may still take some time, and being desirous of strengthening the peaceful aspirations of the two countries, the German Government regards it as appropriate to define now its own attitude towards Belgium. To this end, it makes the following declaration: First, the German Government has taken note of the views which the Belgian Government has thought fit to express. That is to say, (a) of the policy of independence which it intends to exercise in full sovereignty; (b) of its determination to defend the frontiers of Belgium with all its forces against any aggression or invasion and to prevent Belgian territory from being used for purposes of aggression against another state as a passage or as a base of operation by land, by sea, or in the air, and to organize the defense of Belgium in an efficient manner to this purpose. Two: The German Government considers that the inviolability and integrity of Belgium are common interests of the Western Powers. It confirms its determination that in no circumstances will it impair this inviolability and integrity and that it will at all times respect Belgian territory except, of course, in the event of Belgium's taking part in a military action directed against Germany in an armed conflict in which Germany is involved. The German Government, like the British and French Governments, is prepared to assist Belgium should she be subjected to an attack or to invasion. * * *" (TC-34)
The following reply was made:
"The Belgian Government has taken note with great satisfaction of the declaration communicated to it this day by the German Government warmly for this communication." (TC-34)
Thus, in October 1937, Germany gave a solemn guarantee to this small nation of its peaceful aspiration towards her, and its assertion that the integrity of the Belgian frontier was a common interest between her and Belgium and the other Western Powers. Yet eighteen months afterwards Germany had violated that assurance.
That this declaration of October 1937 meant very little to the leaders and to the high command of Germany can be seen from a document which came into existence on 24 august 1938, at the time when the Czechoslovakia drama was unfolding, and when it was uncertain whether there would be war with the Western Powers. This top Secret document is addressed to the General Staff of the 5th section of the German Air Force, and deals with the subject, "Extended Case Green-Appreciation of the Situation with Special consideration of the Enemy," Apparently some staff officer had been asked to prepare this appreciation. The last paragraph (No. H) reads:
"Requests to Armed Forces Supreme Command, Army and Navy. * * *
"Belgium and the Netherlands would, in German hands, represent an extraordinary advantage in the prosecution of the air war against Great Britain as well as against France. Therefore it is held to be essential to obtain the opinion of the Army as to the conditions under which an occupation of this area could be carried out and how long it would take, and in this case it would be necessary to reassess the commitment against Great Britain." (375-PS)
It was apparently assumed by the staff officer who prepared this document, and assumed quite rightly, that the leaders of the German nation and the High Command would not pay the smallest attention to the fact that Germany had given her world not to invade Holland or Belgium. It was recommended as a militarily advantageous thing to do, with the knowledge that, if the commanders and the Fuehrer agreed with that view, treaties would be completely ignored,. Such was the honor of the German Government and of its leaders.
In March of 1939, the remainder of Czechoslovakia had been peacefully annexed, and the time had come for further guarantees. Assurances which were accordingly given to Belgium and the Netherlands on the 28th of April 1939 (TC-30). A guarantee was also made to Luxembourg in a speech by Hitler in the Reichstag, in which he dealt with a communication from Mr. Roosevelt, who was feeling a little uneasy as to Hitler's intentions (TC-42-a). in "The Nazi Plan," a motion picture shown to the Tribunal by the American prosecution (3054-PS), the delivery by Hitler of this part of this speech was shown. Hitler appeared in one of his jocular moods, as his words were greeted and delivered in a jocular vein. The film shows that Goering, who sits above Hitler in the Reichstag, appreciated very much the joke, the joke being this: That it is an absurd suggestion to make that Germany could possibly go to war with any of its neighbors.
In this speech Hitler declared:
"Finally Mr. Roosevelt demands the readiness to give him an assurance that the German fighting forces will not attack the territory or possessions of the following independent nations, and above all, that they will not march into them. And he goes onto name the following as the countries in question: Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Esthonia, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Great Britain, Ireland, France, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Russia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Iraq, Arabia, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and Iran.
"Answer: I started off by taking the trouble to find out in the case of the countries listed, firstly, whether they feel themselves threatened, and secondly and particularly, whether this question Mr. Roosevelt has asked us was put as the result of a demarche by them or at least with their consent.
"The answer was a general negative, which in some cases took the form of a blunt rejection. Actually, the counter-question of mine could not be conveyed to some of the states and nations listed, since they are not at present in possession of their liberty (as for instance Syria), but are occupied by the military forces of democratic states, and therefore, deprived of all their rights.
"Thirdly, apart from that, all the states bordering on Germany have received much more binding assurances and, above all, much more binding proposals than Mr. Roosevelt asked of me in his peculiar telegram." (TC-42-A)
Although that is sneering at Mr. Roosevelt, it is suggesting in the presence, among others, of Goering, as being quite absurd that Germany should nurture any warlike feeling against its neighbors. The hollow falsity of that declaration and of the preceding guarantee is shown by the minutes of Hitler's conference of the 23rd of May (L-79). The first page shows that those present included the Fuehrer, Goering, Raeder, von Brauchitsch, Keitel, Warlimont (Jodl's deputy), and various others. Thee purpose of the conference was an analysis of the situation, which proceeded in this fashion:
"What will this struggle be like?"
"The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored."
"Therefore, if England intends to intervene in the Polish war, we must occupy Holland with lightning speed. We must aim at securing a new defense line on Dutch soil up to the Zuider Zee." (L-79)
in Hitler's speech on 22 August, the following passage occurred:
"Attack from the West from the Maginot Line: I consider this impossible.
"Another possibility is the violation of Dutch, Belgium, and Swiss neutrality. I have no doubts that all these states as well as Scandinavia will defend their neutrality by all available means. England and France will not violate the neutrality of these countries." (798-PS)
Nevertheless, a further assurance was given by the Ambassador of Germany to the Belgian Government:
"In view of the gravity of the international situation, I am expressly instructed by the Head of the German Reich to transmit to Your Majesty the following communication:
"Though the German Government is at present doing everything in its power to arrive at a peaceful solution of the questions at issue between the Reich and Poland, it nevertheless desires to define clearly, here and now, the attitude which it proposes to adopt towards Belgium should a conflict in Europe become inevitable.
"The German Government is firmly determined to abide by the terms of the declaration contained in the German note of October 13, 1937. This provides in effect that Germany will in no circumstances impair the inviolability of Belgium and will at all times respect Belgium territory. The German Government renews this undertaking; however, in the expectation that the Belgium Government, for its part, will observe an attitude of strict neutrality and that Belgium will tolerate no violations on the part of a third power, but that, on the contrary, she will oppose it with all the forces at her disposal. It goes without saying hat if the Belgium Government were to adopt a different attitude, the German Government would naturally be compelled to defend its interests in conformity with the new situation thus created." (TC-36)
It seems likely that the decision having been made to violate Belgian neutrality, those last words were put in to afford some excuse in the future.
A similar document assurance was communicated to Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands on the same day, 26 August 1939 TC-40). Likewise assurances were given to Luxembourg at the same time. It is in the same terms as the other two assurances, and amounts to a complete guarantee with the sting in the tail (TC-42). Poland was occupi9ed by means of a lightning victory, and in October 1939 German armed forces were free f or other tasks. The first step that was taken, so France as the Netherlands and Belgium are concerned, was a German assurance on 6 October 1939, as follows:
"Immediately after I had taken over the affairs of the state I tried to create friendly relations with Belgium. I renounced any revision or any desire for revision. The Reich has not made any demands which would in any way be likely to be considered in Belgium as a threat." (TC-32)
A similar assurance was made to the Netherlands on the same day:
"The new Reich has endeavored to continue the traditional friendship with Holland. It has not taken over any existing differences between the two countries and has not created any new ones." (TC-32)
The value of these pledges of Germany's good faith is shown by an order issued o the very next day, 7 October. This order was from the commander-in-Chief of the Army, von Brauchitsch, and was addresses to various Army Groups. The third paragraph provided:
"The Dutch Border between Ems and Rhine is to be observed only.
"At the same time, Army Group B has to make all preparations according to special orders, for immediate invasion of Butch and Belgian territory, if the political situation so demands." (2329-PS)
Two days later, on 9 October, Hitler directed that:
"Preparations should be made for offensive action on the northern flank of the Western Front crossing the area of Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland. This attack must be carried out as soon and as forcefully as possible. * * *"
"The object of this attack is to acquire as great an area of Holland, Belgium and Northern France as possible." (C-62)
That document in signed by Hitler himself. It is addresses to the Supreme Commander of the Army Keitel; Navy, Raeder; and Air Minister and commander in Chief of the Air Force, Goering. On 15 October 1939, a supplementary order was issued from the Supreme command of the Armed Force. It was signed by Keitel in his familiar red pencil signature, and was addressed to Raeder, Goering, and the General Staff of the Army. It declared, in part:
"It must be the object of the Army's preparations, therefore, to occupy-on receipt of a special order-the territory of Holland, in the first instance as far as the Grebbe-Mass line." (C-62)
The second paragraph deals with the taking possession of the West Frisian Island.
It is that from that moment the decision to violate the neutrality of these three countries had been made. All that remained was to work out the details, to wait until the weather became favorable, and in the meantime, to give no hint that Germany's word was about to be broken again. Otherwise, these small countries might have had some chance of combining with themselves and their neighbors.
Another Keitel directive, again sent to the Supreme commanders of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces, gives details of how the attack is to be carried out. The following are pertinent passages:
"Contrary to previously issued instructions, all action intended against Holland may be carried out without a special order which the general attack will start.
"The attitude of the Dutch armed forces cannot be anticipated ahead of time."
"Wherever there is no resistance, the entry should carry the character of a peaceful occupation."
"At first the Dutch area, including the West-Frisian islands situated just off the coast, for the present without Texel, is to be occupied up to the Grebbe-Mass line."
"The 7th Airborne Division will be committed for the airborne operation only after the possession of bridges across the Albert Canal" (in Belgium) "has been assured." (440-PS)
In addition to Belgium and Holland, the document, in paragraph (5) and (6)(b) mentions Luxembourg. The signature of Keitel is typed. It is authenticated by a staff officer.
A later order of 28 November 1939. over the signature of Keitel. In the usual red pencil, is addressed to the Army, Navy, and Air Force. It states tat if a quick break-through should fail north of Liege, other machinery for carrying out the attack will be used, paragraph 2 shows clearly that the Netherlands is to be violated. It speaks of "The occupation of Walcheren Island and thereby Flushing harbor, or of some other southern Dutch island especially valuable for our sea and air warfare," and "b Taking of one or more Mass crossings between Namur and Dinant * * *." (C-10)
From November until March of 1940 the High Command an the Fuehrer were waiting for favorable weather before A-Day, as they called it. That referred to the attack on Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands. The successive postponements are shown in a series of orders which range in date from 7 November 1939 until 9 May 1940, and which are all signed either by Keitel or by Jodl. (C-72)
On 10 January 1940, a German airplane made a forces landing in Belgium. The occupants endeavored to burn the orders of which they were in possession, but they were only partially successful. Among the papers which were captured is an order to the Commander of the Second Army Group, Air Force Group-Luftflotte-the Second Air Force Fleet, clearly for offensive action against France, Holland, and Belgium. It deals with the disposition (685964-46-50) of the Belgian Army. The Belgian Army covers the Liege-Antwerp Line. Then it deals with the disposition of the Dutch Army. The German Western Army is accordingly directing its attack between the North Sea and the Moselle, with the strongest Possible air-force support, through the Belgo-Luxembourg region. The rest consists of operational details as to the bombing of the various targets in Belgium and in Holland. (TC-58)
The nature of the Army's planning is shown in the in the 1 February 1640 entry in Jodl's diary, which reads in part as follows:
"1. Behavior of parachute units. In front of The Hague they have to be strong enough to break in if necessary by sheer brute force. The 7th division intends to drop units near the town.
"2. Political mission contrasts to some extent with violent action against the Dutch air force." (1809-PS)
The entry for 2 February 1940 states that "landings can be made in the centre of The Hague." On 26 February Jodl wrote:
"Fuehrer raises the question whether it is better to undertake the Weser Exercise before or after case 'yellow.'" On 3 March, he recorded the answer: "Fuehrer decides to carry out Weser Exercise before case 'Yellow', with a few days' interval.' And on May 8, tow days before the invasion, Jodl made this entry:
"Alarming news from Holland, cancelling of furloughs, evacuations, road-blocks, other mobilization measures; according to reports of the intelligence service the British have asked for permission to march in, but the Dutch have refused." (1809-PS)
In other words, the Germans objected because the Dutch were actually making some preparation to resist their endeavor. Furthermore, the Dutch armies, according to the Germans' own intelligence reports, were still adhering properly to their neutrality.
At 4:30 a. m. on 10 May, the months of planning bore fruit, and Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg were violently invaded with all the fury of modern warfare. No warning was given by Germany and no complaint was made by Germany of any breaches of neutrality before this action was taken.
After the invasion of each of the three countries was a fait accompli, the German Ambassador called upon representatives off the three Governments some hours later and handed them documents which were similar in each case, and which are described as memoranda or ultimatums. An account of what happened in Belgium is contained in an official Belgian report:
"From 4:30 information was received which left no shadow of doubt: the hour had struck. Aircraft were first reported in the east. At five o'clock came news of the bombing of two Netherlands aerodromes, the violation of the Belgian frontier, the landing of German soldiers at the Eben-Emael Fort, the bombing of the Jemelle station."
"At 8:30 the German Ambassador came to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When he entered the Minister's room, he began to take a paper from his pocket. M. Spaak" [Belgian Foreign Minister] "stopped him 'I beg your pardon, Mr. Ambassador. I will speak first.' And in an indignant voice, he read the Belgian Government's protest: 'Mr. Ambassador, the German Army has just attacked our country. This is the second time in twenty-five years that Germany has committed a criminal aggression against a neutral and loyal Belgium. What has just happened is perhaps even more odious than the aggression of 1914. No ultimatum, no note, no protest of any kind has ever been placed before the Belgian Government. It is through the attack itself that Belgium has learned that Germany has violated the undertakings given by her on October 13th, 1937, and renewed spontaneously at the beginning of the war. The action of aggression committed by Germany, for which there is no justification whatever, will deeply shock the conscience of the world. The German Reich will be held responsible by history. Belgium is resolved to defend herself. Her cause. Which is the cause of Right, cannot be vanquished'."
"The Ambassador was then able to read the note he had brought: "I am instructed by the Government of the Reich, he said, 'to make the following declaration: In order to forestall the invasion of Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg, for which Great Britain and France have been making preparations clearly aimed at Germany, the Government of the Reich is compelled to ensure the neutrality of the three countries mentioned by means of arms. For this purpose, the government of the Reich will bring up an armed force of the greatest size. So that resistance of any kind will be useless. The Government of the Reich guarantees Belgium's European and colonial territory, assurance well as her dynasty, on condition that no resistance is offered. Should there be any resistance, Belgium will risk the destruction of her country and loss of her independence. It is therefore, in the interests of Belgium that the population be called upon to cease all resistance and that the authorities be given the necessary instructions to make contact with the German Military Command."
"In the middle of this communication, M. Spaak, who had by his side the Secretary-General of the Department, interrupted the Ambassador: 'Hand me the document', he said. 'I should like to spare you so painful a task.' After studying the note, M. Spaak confined himself to pointing out that he had already replied by the protest he had just made. * * *" (TC-58)
The so-called ultimatum, which was delivered some hours after the invasion had started, read in part as follows:
"The Reich Government has for a long time had no doubts as to what was the chief aim of the British and French war policy. It consists of the spreading of the war to other countries, and of the misuse of their peoples as auxiliary and mercenary troops for England and France.
"The last attempt of this sort was the plan to occupy Scandinavia with the help of Norway, in order to set up a new front against Germany in this region. It was only Germany's last minute action which upset the project. Germany has furnished documentary evidence of this before the eyes of the world.
"Immediately after the British-French action in Scandinavia miscarried, England and France took up their policy of war expansion in another direction. In this respect, while the retreat in flight of the British troops from Norway was still going on, the England Prime Minister announced that, as a result of the altered situation in Scandinavia, England was once more in a position to go ahead with the transfer of the full weight of her Navy to the Mediterranean, and that English and French units were already on the way to Alexandria. The Mediterranean now became the center of English-French war propaganda. This was partly to gloss over the Scandinavian defeat and the big loss of prestige before their own people and before the world, and partly to make to appear that the Balkans had been chosen for the next theater of war against Germany.
"In reality, however, this apparent shifting to the Mediterranean of English-French war policy had quite another purpose. It was nothing but a diversion manoeuvre in grand style, to deceive Germany as to the direction of the next English-French attack. For, as the Reich Government has long been ware, the true aim of England and France is the carefully prepared and now immediately imminent attack on Germany in the West, so to advance through Belgium and Holland to the region of the Ruhr.
"Germany has recognized and respected the inviolability of Belgium and Holland, it being of course understood that these two countries in the event of a war of Germany against England and France would maintain the strictest neutrality. "Belgium and the Netherlands have not fulfilled this condition." (TC-57)
The so-called ultimatum goes on to complain of the hostile expressions in the Belgian and the Netherlands press, and to allege attempts by the British intelligence to bring a revolution into Germany with the assistance of Belgium and the Netherlands. Reference is made to military preparation of the two countries, and it is pointed out that Belgium has fortified the Belgian frontier. A complaint was made in regard to Holland, that British aircraft had flown over the Netherlands country. Other charges were made against the neutrality of these two countries, although no instances were given (TC-57). The document continued:
"In this struggle for existence forced upon the German people by England and France, the Reich Government is not disposed to await submissively the attack by England and France and to allow them to carry the war over Belgium and the Netherlands into German territory. It has therefore now issued the command to German troops to ensure the neutrality of these countries by all the military means at the disposal of the Reich." (TC-57)
It is unnecessary, in view of the documents previously adverted to, to emphasize the falsity of that statement. It is now known that for months preparations had been made to violate the neutrality of these three countries. This document is merely saying, "The orders to do so have now been issued."
A similar document, similar in terms altogether, was handed to the representatives of the Netherlands Government; and a memorandum was send to the Luxembourg Government, which enclosed with it a copy of the document handed to the Governments of Belgium and the Netherlands. The second paragraph of the latter declared:
"In defense against the imminent attack, the German troops have now received the order to safeguard the neutrality of these two countries * * *". (TC-60)
The protest of the Belgium Government against the crime which was committed against her is contained in TC-59.
Document Description Vol. Page
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Article 6(a)............I 5
International Military Tribunal, Indictment Number 1, Sections IV (F) 5; V.............. I 2729
Note: A single asterisk (*) before a document indicates that the document was received in evidence at the Nurnberg trial. A double asterisk (**) before a document number indicates that the document was received to during the trial but was not formally received in evidence, for the reason given in parentheses following the description of the document. The USA series number, given in parentheses following the description of the document, is the official exhibit number assigned by the court.
*375-PS Case Green with wider implications, report of Intelligence Division, Luftwaffe general Staff, 25 August 1938. (USA 84)......... III 280
*440-PS Directive No. 8 signed by Keitel, 20 November 1939, for the conduct of the war. (GB 107)......... III 397
*798-PS Hitler's speech to Commanders-in-Chief, at Obersalzberg, 22 August 1939. (USA 29)........... III 581
*1809-PS Entries from Jodl's diary, February 1940 to May 1940. (GB 88)......... IV 377
*2329-PS Order by Commander in Chief of the Army, 7 October 1939. (GB 105)...... IV 1037
*3054-PS "The Nazi Plan", script of a motion picture composed of captured German film. (USA 167)....... V 801
*C-10 OKW directive, 28 November 1939, signed by Keitel, subject: Employment of 7th Flieger Division. (GB 1808)...... VI 817
*C-62 Directive No. 6 on the conduct of war, signed by Hitler, 9 October 1939: directive by Keitel, 15 October 1939 on Fall "Gelb". (GB 106)...... VI 880
*C-72 Orders postponing "A" day in the West, November 1939 to May 1940. (GB 109)...... VI 893
*L-52 Memorandum and Directives for conduct of war in the West, 9 October 1939. (USA 540)......... VII 800
*L-79 Minutes of conference, 23 May 1939, "indoctrination on the political situation and future aims". (USA 27)....... VII 847
*TC-3 Hague Convention (3) Relative to opening of Hostilities. (GB 2).......... VIII 279
*TC-4 Hague Convention (5) Respecting Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in War on Land. (GB 2).......... VIII 282
*TC-13 Arbitration Convention between Germany and Belgium at Locarno, 16 October 1925. (GB 15)........ VIII 320
*TC-16 Convention of Arbitration and conciliation between Germany and the Netherlands, signed at The Hague, 20 May 1926. (GB 97)...... VIII 337
*TC-19 Kellogg-Briand Pact at Paris. 1929 Reichsgesetzblatt, Part II, No. 9, pp.97-101. (GB 18)......... VIII 359
*TC-20 Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation between Germany and Luxembourg, signed at Geneva, 11 September 1929. (GB 98)...... VIII 362
*TC-30 German assurance to Denmark, Norway, Belgium, and the Netherlands, 28 April 1939, from Documents of German Politics, Part VII, I, pp. 139, 172-175. (GB 78)...... 379
*TC-32 German assurance to Norway, 6 October 1939, from documents of German Politics, Vol. VII, p.350. (GB 80)........... VIII 381
*TC-33 German assurance to Belgium and the Netherlands, 30 January 1937, from Documents of German Politics, Part VI, pp.42-43. (GB 99)...... VIII 381
*TC-34 German Declaration to the Belgian Minister of 13 October 1937. (GB 100)........ VIII 381
*TC-36 Declaration made by Ambassador of Germany on 26 August 1939. (GB 102)...... VIII 382
*TC-37 German assurance to Belgium, 6 October 1939, from Documents of German Politics, Vol. VII, p.351...... VIII 383
*TC-40 Declaration of German Minister to the Netherlands, 26 August 1939. (GB 103)....... VIII 383
*TC-41 German assurance to the Netherlands, 6 October 1939, from Documents of German Politics, Vol. VII, p.351....... VIII 384
*TC-42 German assurance to Luxemburg, 26 August 1939. (GB 104)....... VIII 384
*TC-42-A German assurance to Luxemburg, 28 April 1939. (GB 101)........ VIII 385
*TC-57 German ultimatum to Belgium and the Netherlands, 9 May 1940, from Documents of German Politics, Part Viii, pp.142-150. (GB 112)........ VIII 416
*TC-58 "Belgium, the official account of what happened 1939-1940". (GB 111)......... VIII 421
*TC-58-A Secret instruction to the Commander of 2nd Luftflotte found in German Aeroplane of 10 January 1940. (GB 110)......... VIII 423
*TC-59 Protest from Belgium, 10 May 1940, following German aggression. (GB 111)......... VIII 429
*TC-60 German memorandum to Luxemburg, 9 May 1940, from Documents of German Politics, Part VIII, pp. 150-151. (GB 113)........ VIII 431
Affidavit H Affidavit of Franz Halder, 22 November 1945............. VIII 643
**Chart No.12 German Aggression. (Enlargement displayed to Tribunal.)........... VIII 781
**Chart No.13 Violations of Treaties, Agreements and Assurances. (Enlargement displayed to Tribunal)...... VIII 782